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I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0") and 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (case transferred from Supreme Court). 
II. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105, Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act (reproduced at Addendum 2 of the Opening Brief of Brittney 
Fenn ("Fenn")). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a plaintiffs attempt to hale into court an Arizona-based 
company that has absolutely no contacts with the State of Utah. The case alleges injuries 
from an e-mail allegedly violating Utah's statute regulating unsolicited commercial e-mail 
(Utah Code Ann. 13-16-101 to 105 (Supp. 2002) (the "Statute")); however, it is clear 
from the record below (the "Record") that Appellee, Mleads Enterprises, Inc. ("Mleads") 
did not, and could not have reasonably anticipated, that the e-mail would reach the state 
of Utah or its residents. 
IV. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS IN THE RECORD 
Mleads: 
(a) does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah, (b) does not transact any 
business in the State of Utah, (c) is not licensed to do business in the State of 
Utah, (d) does not employ or recruit any employees or agents in Utah, (e) does 
not have any bank accounts in Utah, (f) does not maintain telephone or 
1 
facsimile numbers in Utah, (g) does not advertise or solicit business in Utah, 
(h) does not have any shareholders in Utah, (i) does not pay taxes in Utah, and 
(j) does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from activities 
in Utah. 
(Record, p. 85, Order, J^ 6.) The court below (the "District Court") additionally found that 
"Mleads hired a third party independent contractor to market Mleads' services to 
consumers,... and that at no time prior to transmission did Mleads learn any information 
regarding the locale or identity of Plaintiff." (Record, p. 88, Order, f 18 (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted).) The District Court further found that the third 
party marketing company would not provide information regarding locale even if 
requested by Mleads. (Record, p. 88, Order, j^ 18.) Fenn mischaracterizes the facts in 
the Record. Fenn's statement of facts incorrectly state that "Mleads advertises in the 
State of Utah," and that Mleads admitted to sending the e-mails to Fenn. (Fenn's 
Opening Brief, p. 5.) These facts appear nowhere in the Record. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Personal jurisdiction is not granted under the Statute. Statutory grants of personal 
jurisdiction must be explicit. That Statute does not contain any explicit grant of 
jurisdiction. 
2. Personal jurisdiction is not proper under Utah's long-arm statute (Utah Code Ann. 
78-27-24 (Supp. 2002) (the "Long-arm Statute")). Assertion of jurisdiction in this 
case by the State of Utah over Mleads would violate Due Process, as Mleads has 
no contacts with the State of Utah. 
VL ARGUMENT 
A. NEITHER THE COMPLAINT, NOR ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION ALLEGE 
SUFFICIENT JURISDICTIONAL FACTS 
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The uncontroverted facts, Fenn's conclusory assertions notwithstanding, indicate 
that Mleads lacks any contacts with the State of Utah and did not purposefully direct any 
activities to the State of Utah, its residents, or to Fenn. 
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic & 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990). While a court resolves factual 
disputes on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the plaintiffs favor, 
"only the well pled facts of plaintiff s complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory 
allegations, must be accepted as true." Wenz v. Memery Crystal 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 
(10th Cir. 1995). "When jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on 
allegations of jurisdiction in its complaint in the face of an affidavit by defendant which 
specifically contradicts those general allegations." Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc.. 610 
P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980). The procedural history of this lawsuit places the District 
Court's dismissal of the action in context. 
Fenn filed this lawsuit on January 3, 2003, alleging numerous violations of the 
Statute. The Complaint contained one sole allegation ostensibly relating to jurisdiction: 
Defendant sent, or caused to be sent, to plaintiff an unsolicited commercial e-mail. 
(Record, p. 86, Order, % 9.) Mleads, having no contacts with the State of Utah, brought a 
motion to dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Motion to 
Dismiss was accompanied by the declaration of Shay Tyler ("Tyler Declaration"), 
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principal of Mleads. As noted by the District Court, the Tyler Declaration attested that 
Mleads: 
(a) does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah, (b) does not transact any 
business in the State of Utah, (c) is not licensed to do Business in the State of 
Utah, (d) does not employ or recruit any employees or agents in Utah, (e) does 
not have any bank accounts in Utah, (f) does not maintain telephone or 
facsimile numbers in Utah, (g) does not advertise or solicit business in Utah, 
(h) does not have any shareholders in Utah, (i) does not pay taxes in Utah, 
[and] (j) does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from 
activities in Utah. 
(Record, p. 85, Order, % 6.) In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Fenn filed a responsive 
pleading without any accompanying evidence or testimony-i.e., Fenn "rested on the very 
general factual allegations made in [the] Complaint." (Record, p. 85, Order, f 8.) Fenn 
instead principally relied on the argument that Mleads had somehow waived its 
jurisdictional argument by appearing generally. Fenn further argued that the Statute itself 
conferred jurisdiction, and that Fenn's general allegations were sufficient to find 
jurisdiction. (Record, p 86, Order, ^ j 10.) 
The Complaint nowhere alleged that Mleads purposefully availed itself to the laws 
and benefits of the State of Utah, or for example, that Fenn ever informed Mleads that 
Fenn was a Utah resident. Nor did the Complaint allege any course of dealings between 
the parties that would have formed the basis of Mleads's knowledge of the Fenn's state of 
residence. In fact the Complaint specifically alleged that the parties had no prior 
dealings. The District Court properly considered the minimal jurisdictional allegations of 
the Complaint, along with the allegations of Tyler Declaration, which, because they were 
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not controverted by specific allegations, must be taken as true. See Gillman v. Sprint 
Communs. Co.. L.P.. 2004 UT App 143 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (failure to dispute factual 
issue results in waiver). The District Court concluded, based on these operative facts, that 
personal jurisdiction was not present in this case. Fenn should not now be permitted to 
complain due to Fenn's own failure to present the requisite evidence. 
B. JURISDICTION IS NOT CONFERRED BY THE STATUTE 
Fenn argued that the Statute confers personal jurisdiction, irrespective of the 
contacts between Mleads and the State of Utah. The District Court correctly rejected this 
argument. 
A statutory grant of personal jurisdiction must be explicit. See, e.g.. Federal 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Abrams. 893 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act did not provide for personal jurisdiction, where Congress did not 
explicitly grant it); Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio. 870 F. 
Supp. 1102, 1108 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that ERISA contained explicit grant of 
personal jurisdiction). D.A. v. Utah, 63 P.3d 607 (Utah 2003) provides an example of an 
explicit statutory grant of personal jurisdiction. The court in that case found jurisdiction, 
and noted that "according to its plain language, subsection 78-3a-l 10(13) confers 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent if [the parent receives notification and the 
child resides in the state at the time the proceeding commences]." In contrast, in the 
present case, the Statute contains no such grant of personal jurisdiction. The Statute 
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merely provides that "an action may be brought by" a person who receives an e-mail 
message violative of the Statute. Thus, personal jurisdiction, if at all, must come from 
another source.1 
C. THE ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
The Long-arm Statute serves as the default source of possible personal jurisdiction 
in the State of Utah. The Utah legislature declared that the Long-arm Statute should be 
interpreted to provide the fullest extent of jurisdiction allowed under the Due Process 
Clause. See SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp.. 969 P.2d. 430, 
433 (Utah 1988). Consequently, Utah courts collapse the Long-arm Statute inquiry into 
the Due Process inquiry. Id. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution limits a state's power to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant. "[The] constitutional touchstone of the determination whether an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction comports with due process remains whether the defendant 
purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
California. 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted); see also Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 
P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1995)). In this case, the Record shows that Mleads did not, and indeed, could 
1
 Fenn did not allege facts sufficient to support general jurisdiction and does not argue on appeal that 
general jurisdiction is proper. 
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not have, anticipated that any e-mails would reach Fenn or other Utah residents. 
1. Due Process Requires Purposeful Availment, or Purposeful Direction 
of Activity Toward the Forum State or Plaintiff 
L Legal standard. 
The "minimum contacts" requirement serves to protect the defendant against the 
burden of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum, and to ensure that states do not 
reach beyond the limits of sovereignty imposed by their role in the federal system. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 
2d 490 (1980). Under United States Supreme Court precedent, the minimum contacts 
underlying the assertion of jurisdiction must have some basis in the non-resident 
defendant's purposeful actions within the forum state, or directed towards the forum state. 
See, e^ , Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 812, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). 
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that defendants will not be "haled into a 
jurisdiction through 'random,' fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1985). 
Utah courts, following the United States Supreme Court, have similarly required 
purposeful availment as a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction. For example, in 
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction requires 
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. 
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Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1974). That case involved a claim 
brought by a plaintiff against a California car dealership. Plaintiff purchased the car in 
California and subsequently moved to Utah, where she sued the California dealership. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was not proper since the California car 
dealership had not directed any activities towards the State of Utah or its residents. 
Similarly, in Stewart v. Hennesey, the Utah District Court held that it could properly 
assert jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile upgrade business due to the e-mails and 
telephone conversations exchanged between the Utah plaintiff and the non-resident 
defendant. Stewart v. Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198,1203 (D. Utah 2002). In relying 
on the e-mail based contacts between the Utah plaintiff and the non-resident defendant 
the Hennesey court distinguished between a non-resident's act of making a world wide 
website generally available and the act of intentionally communicating with the plaintiff 
via the world wide website. The court noted that "[c]ourts have emphasized 'purposeful 
availment,' ... courts look for a purposeful act by which defendant avails himself of the 
privileges and protections of the forum." Hennesey. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1203. In Hennesey. 
the court concluded that jurisdiction was proper since the "defendant [] chose to do 
business through its website with the plaintiff." Id. Such purposeful action is simply not 
present in this case. 
While some courts in the past tended to give Calder v. Jones and its effects test an 
expansive reading, the more modern and current view reads the "effects" test set forth in 
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Calder v. Jones as requiring "purposeful availment". Many recent cases involving actions 
taken, and injuries allegedly perpetrated, over the Internet, and which have had occasion 
to apply Calder, hold that Due Process continues to require purposeful availment. See, 
e.g.. Pavlovich v. Superior Court. 29 Cal. 4th 262,270, 58 P.3d 2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 
(2002). Indeed, the California Supreme Court noted in Pavlovich that "most courts agree 
that merely asserting that a defendant knew or should have known that his intentional acts 
would cause harm in the forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction under 
[Calder's] effects test." Pavlovich. 29 Cal. 4th at 270 (emphasis added); see also 
Starways. Inc. v. Curry. 980 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah 1999) (noting that under Calder's test, 
jurisdiction was proper where "the uncontroverted allegations are that defendants 
intentionally published defamatory statements to persons in Utah, impugning [plaintiffs] 
business, which is located in Utah"). Pavlovich involved a lawsuit filed by the DVD 
Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA") against Matthew Pavlovich ("Pavlovich"), a 
Texas resident. DVDCCA alleged that Pavlovich misappropriated DVDCCA trade 
secrets by posting the source code of a program called DeCSS, which allowed users to 
circumvent CSS (content scrambling system) technology which generally prevented the 
playing of copyrighted motion pictures without the necessary algorithms and keys. 
Pavlovich had never been to California and had no direct contacts with California, but 
DVDCCA argued that since he knew or should have known that he harmed the motion 
picture industry by posting DeCSS, he should anticipate being haled into a California 
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court. The California Supreme Court disagreed: 
DVDCCA's argument therefore boils down to the following syllogism: 
jurisdiction exists solely because Pavlovich's tortious conduct had a forseeable 
effect in California. But mere forseeability is not enough for jurisdiction, 
[citations omitted] Otherwise the commission of any intentional tort affecting 
industries in California would subject a defendant to jurisdiction in California. 
We decline to adopt such an expansive interpretation of the effects test. 
Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 277 (emphasis added) (citing Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal 
Canadian Golf Ass'n. 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200 (CD. Cal. 2000) (finding jurisdiction 
not proper against Canadian not-for-profit entity which allegedly libeled California 
corporation based on Canadian entity's presumed knowledge of California plaintiffs 
location and principal place of business) ("Merely knowing that a corporate [plaintiff] 
might be located in California does not fulfill the effects test.")). Many other recent cases 
have similarly rejected an expansive reading of Calder's effects test. For example, Young 
v. New Haven Advocate, involved a Virginia prison warden's claims that he had been 
defamed by an article published by Connecticut newspapers and posted on-line. The 
reporters knew that the subject of the story resided in Virginia and made several calls into 
Virginia to gather information for the articles. The lower court accepted the warden's 
claims that jurisdiction was proper because the newspapers knew that the warden would 
be harmed in Virginia since he resided and worked there. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, 
holding that the newspapers, "through the Internet postings, [did not] manifest an intent to 
target and focus on Virginia readers." Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 
263 (4th Cir. 2002). As set forth below, the uncontroverted evidence indicated that 
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Mleads did not intend to direct actions or the E-Mail to the State of Utah or its residents 
including Fenn. 
ii. The undisputed facts show an absence of any purposeful availment. 
The evidence before the District Court indicated that Mleads hired a third party 
marketing company ("Marketing Company") (based in the state of Florida) to assist in the 
promotion of Mleads. (Record, p. 28, Tyler Declaration, f^ 3.) Marketing Company 
assured Mleads that at all times, Marketing Company complied with relevant laws, 
including but not limited to the Act. (Record, p. 28, Tyler Declaration, f 3.) 
Additionally, Marketing Company did not provide to Mleads the locale of the end users to 
which the Marketing Company directs its promotion or advertising efforts or any other 
specific information regarding the Consumers, including their state of residence. 
(Record, pp. 28-9, Tyler Declaration, f^ 4.) Marketing Company did not provide any such 
information even if requested by Mleads. (Record, p. 29, Tyler Declaration, ^ 4.) Mleads 
was never aware of Fenn's identity or state of residence prior to transmission of the E-
mail. (Record, p. 29, Tyler Declaration, f^ 4.) Fenn did not put forth any evidence 
indicating that Mleads actively (i.e., intentionally) sold any product or services, directly 
marketed any product or services, or advertised any product or services to consumers in 
the State of Utah, or ever contemplated marketing here. The uncontro verted facts showed 
that Mleads did not instruct Marketing Company to target its efforts at the consumers in 
the State of Utah, or even that Mleads could reasonably foresee that any promotions 
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would ever reach the state of Utah. Thus, Mleads did not undertake any purposeful act to 
avail itself to the laws and benefits of the State of Utah; nor did Mleads direct any actions 
towards the State of Utah or its residents, including Fenn. Indeed, the District Court 
concluded that "Mleads had no knowledge, prior to the email being sent . . . that a 
solicitation would be directed to a resident of this State"—"this single contact [Le ,^ the e-
mail allegedly sent by Mleads to Fenn] should not be construed as [Mleads's] knowingly 
and purposefully availing itself of the benefits of [the State of Utah]." Thus, jurisdiction 
is not proper under Due Process and Calder. See also STV Int'l Marketing v. Cannondale 
Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Utah. 1990) (noting that the Tenth Circuit "has ruled 
that the 'existence of letters of telephone calls to the forum state related to the plaintiffs 
action will not necessarily meet due process standards.'"). 
2. Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Allow for the Assertion of 
Jurisdiction over Mleads Where Mleads Merely Sends out an E-mail 
Message That Fortuitously Happens to Reach a Utah State Resident 
Mleads is much like the distributor who ships its goods into the stream of 
commerce. Cases are uniform in holding that a distributor who does not direct any efforts 
towards a particular local cannot be haled into court in a locale merely because one of its 
products happened to reach the locale. 
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. California, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
purposeful availment requirement, stressing that Due Process requires some conscious 
action on the part of the non-resident defendant which is directed towards the forum state. 
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Asahi also stands for the proposition that a non-resident defendant cannot be subject to 
jurisdiction in a state based on the non-resident's activities of releasing instrumentalities 
into the stream of commerce that happen to reach the forum state and cause injury in the 
forum state. Asahi involved the state of California's attempt to assert jurisdiction over 
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), a Japanese company. Asahi manufactured a 
tube assembly that found its way into a motorcycle tire that exploded while being driven 
by a California resident in California. The Supreme Court found that the State of 
California could not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi, 
notwithstanding Asahi's awareness that the tube assembly may find its way to California. 
The Court relied on the fact that Asahi had not taken "any action to purposefully avail 
itself of the California market." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed that 
the connection between the non-resident defendant and the forum state "must come about 
by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id 
(emphasis in original). 
Mleads can be analogized to Asahi, and the E-Mail to Asahi's tube assembly (both 
of which happened to find their way into the forum state). The sender of an e-mail has no 
ability to differentiate from what location in the world an e-mail will be accessed. Fenn 
could have accessed her e-mail account via any world wide web-enabled device located in 
any city, state or country on the planet. Asahi sold its tube assemblies to tire 
manufacturers (who then sold the tires to motorcycle manufacturers) and could not 
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predict the states in which the tube assemblies may cause injuries. The United States 
Supreme Court held that Asahi did not subject itself to jurisdiction in the State of 
California for an accident that happened to occur in California caused by its product 
because it did not intentionally direct its product to the State of California. Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 107-08. The Court went further, noting that since the defendants had not put forth 
evidence of Asahi's purposeful availment Jurisdiction was not proper, notwithstanding 
Asahi's awareness that some tube assemblies would find their way to California. Asahi, 
480 U.S. at 104. Similarly, Mleads hired Marketing Company to promote its business. 
Marketing Company engaged in various promotional campaigns, including an e-mail 
marketing based campaign. As part of the campaign, Marketing Company generally sent 
e-mails to various individuals. Neither Marketing Company nor Mleads could control 
where the recipients accessed such e-mails. See Kaempe v. Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18386 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting the absence of control over the location of receipt 
of e-mail because an "e-mail could have been retrieved from anywhere in the world") 
(emphasis added). In the same way that jurisdiction over Asahi was not proper, 
jurisdiction over Mleads is similarly not proper. Mleads cannot be subject to the 
jurisdiction of Utah for an alleged statutory violation arising out of the fortuitous event 
that one of the Marketing Company's promotions was accessed by a Utah resident 
somewhere in the world. To find jurisdiction on the basis of a few isolated e-mail 
messages alone would then require every Internet merchant be apprized of and comply 
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with a patchwork of state (and international) laws even though the merchant may not have 
purposefully directed any activity to those jurisdictions. Unless an Internet marketer 
intentionally directs its activities towards a certain state, it does not avail itself to 
jurisdiction there. While jurisdiction would otherwise be proper if defendant put forth 
evidence of Mleads's intent to send e-mails to Utah or target Utah residents, jurisdiction 
is not proper when based on a single e-mail that was not purposefully directed to the 
forum state. Moreover, such a finding of jurisdiction does not take into account the 
realities of electronic mail and its transmission. 
Unlike telephone calls or postal mail, where the recipient's geographic location 
can be determined in advance by the sender, a sender of an e-mail has no way of 
determining the recipient's geographic location based on the e-mail address. See Hydro 
Engineering. Inc. v. Landa. Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1130,1136, fn. 1 (CD. Utah 2002) ("[e-
mail] addresses [do] not identify the particular state in which the e-mail was actually 
received, opened"). Thus, the evidence, and the practical realities, do not support the 
proposition that Mleads or the Marketing Company had any idea any e-mails would ever 
reach a Utah state resident; nor could they have found out such information even if they 
set out to do so. 
3. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Would Be Contrary to Traditional Notions 
of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
Even if the Court finds sufficient contacts between Mleads and the State of Utah, 
Due Process further requires the Court to consider whether the assertion of personal 
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jurisdiction offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). This inquiry 
requires the Court to weigh the interests of the parties, the relationship between the 
parties, the forum and the cause of action. Mallory Engfg v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs.. 
618 P.2d 1004, 1008-09 (Utah 1980). Additionally, the burden on the non-resident 
defendant must be viewed in light of the importance of the conflict, which is often 
evidenced by the amount in controversy. Id. In this case, Mleads, lacking any contacts 
with the State of Utah, would be significantly taxed by being required to litigate this 
claim in Utah Courts. Mleads would have to travel to Utah, engage local Utah counsel 
and undergo significant expense in exploring facts and evidence in the State of Utah (e.g., 
examine and depose Fenn and Fenn's personal computer). Moreover, when viewed in the 
context of the amount in controversy (i.e., ten dollars ($10.00) per e-mail, see Record, p. 
2, Complaint ][ 12) this burden becomes unreasonable, and the exertion of personal 
jurisdiction contravenes traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly concluded that Fenn's Complaint failed to allege facts 
sufficient to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Mleads. The assertion of 
jurisdiction is not authorized by Statute, and further would be contrary to Due Process. 
/// 
/// 
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For the foregoing reasons, Mleads respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
judgment below. 
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VIII. ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
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